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ABSTRACT 
There are many factors that influence whether a political leader exits out of office or 
remains in power. In this thesis, we evaluate the impact of one important factor, income 
inequality, on the survival prospects of the leader using data for 152 countries for the 
period 1962 - 2015. We use a linear probability model, a lo git model, and a Cox 
Proportional Hazard Model, all of which indicate that higher income inequality increases 
the probability of leader survival. To address the potential endogeneity of income 
inequality, I use a simultaneous equations model and the results hold. The results are also 
robust to controlling for a host ofleader-, party-, and country-level variables, as well as 
the bimodal nature of income inequality. Evidence is also given for polity type, which is 
the degree to which a country is democratic, as an important factor in simultaneously 
determining income inequality and political survival. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Does an equitable economy increase the likelihood that national leaders will remain in 
office? The impact of the state of the economy on political survival is a question of 
fundamental importance, but there have been relatively few research topics addressing 
this issue. One measure of an equitable economy is income inequality which, usually 
measured by the Gini coefficient, refers to the extent to which income is distributed in an 
uneven manner among a population. This thesis attempts to answer the question of 
whether this unequal distribution has any impact on whether a leader retains her position. 
By income, we mean the revenue streams from wages, salaries, interests on a savings 
account, dividends from shares of stock, rent, and profits from selling something for more 
than you paid for it. Unlike wealth statistics, income figures do not include the values of 
home, stock, or other possessions. However, income inequality does follow the principle 
of unequal distribution. It's winner-take-all, where the top 1 percent have as much loot as 
the bottom 50 percent - and where the richest eighty-five people have as much as the 
bottom three and a half billion (Global Wealth Report, 2015). This same brutal principle 
of unequal distribution applies outside the financial domain - anywhere that creative 
production is required. The majority of scientific papers are published by a very small 
group of scientists. Just a handful of authors sell all the books. A million and a half 
separately titled books sell each year in the US. However, only five hundred of these sell 
more than a hundred thousand copies (Fenner et al., 2010). A tiny proportion of 
musicians produces almost all the recorded commercial music. In 2016, the most popular 
artist, Drake, was streamed 6.1 billion times, followed by Rihanna (3.3 billion streams), 
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Twenty One Pilots (2.7 billion streams) and The Weeknd (2.6 billion streams). Moving 
down a hundred places from Drake, the 101 st ranked group was the California band Los 
Tigres de Norte, which was streamed 0.5 billion times, or less than 10 percent as much as 
Drake. 
Technology has certainly widened inequality in the music industry, but unequal 
distribution prevailed even in the 15th century. Just four classical composers (Bach, 
Beethoven, Mozart, and Tchaikovsky) wrote almost all the music played by modern 
orchestras. Bach, for his part, composed so prolifically that it would take decades of work 
merely to hand-copy his scores, yet only a small fraction of his work is commonly 
performed, thus demonstrating the law of unequal distribution again. 
This principle is sometimes known as Price's law, after Derek J. de Solla Price, the 
researcher who discovered its application in science in 1963. However, the basic 
principle had been discovered much earlier by Vilfredo Pareto (1848 - 1923), who 
noticed its applicability to wealth distribution in the early twentieth century, and it 
appears true for every society ever studied, regardless of governmental form. It also 
applies to the population of cities (a very small number have almost all the people), the 
mass of heavenly bodies (a very small number hoard all the matter), and the frequency of 
words in a language (90 percent of communication occurs using just 500 words). 
Given this natural tendency for unequal distribution to occur, why do we study 
inequality? Numerous literatures in this field have pointed out that inequality in terms of 
income and wealth, is a self-feeding beast. Corruption and inequality feed off each other, 
creating a vicious cycle between corruption, unequal distribution of power in society, and 
unequal distribution of income and wealth. As the Panama papers showed, it is still far 
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too easy for the rich and powerful to exploit the opaqueness of the global financial 
system to enrich themselves at the expense of the public good. Grand corruption cases, 
from Petrobras and Odebrecht in Brazil to Ukranian ex-president Viktor Yanukovych, 
show how collusion between businesses and politicians denies national economies of 
billions of dollars of revenues that were siphoned off to benefit the few at the expense of 
the many. This kind of systemic grand corruption violates human rights, prevents 
sustainable development and fuels social exclusion. 
A society with relatively high income inequality might be an equitable society, and 
wouldn't be a problem, if the observed inequality were the outcome of an entirely fair 
process - in which some worked harder or took more economic risks with resultant 
greater economic gains than others However, in many countries, the operation of legal, 
political and regulatory institutions is undermined by the wealthy and the powerful for 
their own benefits (Glaeser et al., 2002). If one person is sufficiently richer than another, 
and courts are corruptible, then the legal system will favor the rich, not the just. Likewise, 
if political and regulatory institutions can be moved by wealth or influence, they will 
favor the established, and not the efficient. 
Whether the income inequality of a country systematically affects the abilities of leaders 
to succeed in their positions is of considerable consequence, and of great interest to 
policy makers, domestic participants in the political process, outsiders who wish to 
encourage or discourage leadership transitions, and others. Even Kuznets in his famous 
paper about economic growth and income inequality followed his conclusions with the 
question, 'Can the political framework of the underdeveloped societies withstand the 
strain which further widening of income inequality is likely to generate?' 
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In this thesis, we hypothesize that higher income inequality leads to higher survival 
prospects of political leaders. We measure income inequality with the widely used Gini 
Index. In societies infected with crony capitalism, a widening gap between the high 
income and the low-income people incentivizes the rich to maintain the status quo. 
Political leaders, who most of the times themselves are on the upper end of the income 
distribution, employ rent seeking behavior through lobbying and appeal to the rich. In 
return, they provide benefits to their supporters, whether in the form of tax breaks, 
leniency in the courts, and even outright cronyism. 
We might be inclined to put the blame on those political and regulatory institutions, for 
being fallible to corruption and not doing what they were designed for. We're also often 
appalled by how sly and dishonest most politicians are. However, politicians, who are 
also human, do respond to certain incentives, and in this, lies a potential endogeneity 
problem in our thesis. 
In fact, the self-interested calculations and actions of rulers are the driving force behind 
all of politics. In 2014, Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff' s party had funneled some 
funds to pay off politicians, buy their votes and help with political campaigns, which later 
led to the Petrobras scandal. Even excluding corruption cases, politicians act on their own 
interest. Amidst all the debate about national interest, what did President Obama worry 
about in formulating his Afghan Policy? If he did not announce a timetable for 
withdrawal from Afghanistan, he would lose support from his Democratic electoral base 
(Simon and Schuster, 2010). Similarly, President Kennedy was concerned that if he took 
no action in what became the Cuban missile crisis, he would be impeached, and the 
Democrats would pay a heavy price in the 1962 midterm elections (Norton, 1969). 
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National interest might have been on each of their minds, but their personal political 
welfare was front and center. 
To understand why politicians do what politicians do, we need to read and remember the 
words of Niccolo Machiavelli, a late 15th century political advisor and political theorist 
who argued that we shouldn't think that politicians are immoral and simply bad for lying 
and dissembling and maneuvering. In his view, 'A good politician isn't one who is 
friendly, honest or kind. It's someone who knows how to defend, enrich and bring honor 
to the state." 
Machiavelli in his books, the Prince and the Discourses, addressed the central problem of 
politics: it is almost impossible to be both a good politician and a good person in a 
traditional Christian sense. The overwhelming responsibility of a good prince is to defend 
the state from external and internal threats: to stable governance. While it will be 
theoretically be wonderful for a leader to be both loved and obeyed, a Prince should 
always aim to inspire terror, for this is what ultimately keeps people in check. 
Machiavelli's Christian contemporaries had suggested that leaders should be merciful, 
peaceful, generous, and tolerant. They thought that being a good politician was the same 
as being a good Christian. But Machiavelli argued that there is an incompatibility 
between good Christian ethics and good governance. 
Girolamo Savanorola was a Dominican friar, who'd briefly come to be the ruler of 
Florence in 1494. He'd come to power promising to build the city of God on Earth. He 
preached against the excesses and tyranny of Medici government, and even managed to 
rule Florence as a peaceful, democratic, and relatively honest state. However, his tenure 
couldn't last. Because in Machiavelli's view, it was based on the weakness of being 
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'good' in a Christian sense. Once his regime became a threat to the corrupt Pope 
Alexander, he was captured and tortured, then hanged and burned before the public. This, 
Machiavelli argued, is what tends to happen to the nice guys in politics. 
The first and foremost priority of a leader is to survive in office. Mesquita and Smith 
(2011) argue that "Ruling is about staying in power, not about good governance." To this 
end, leaders buy support by rewarding their essential backers relative to others. Through 
taxation, leaders have the resources to enrich their most essential supporters. Taxation, 
usually in autocratic settings, redistributes from those outside the coalition (the poor) to 
those inside the coalition (the rich). Autocratic systems demonstrate this principle, for 
here, people are rich solely because they are in the winning coalition, and others are poor 
because they are not. Philip Chiyangwa, a protege of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe had 
stated it bluntly, "I am rich because I belong to Zanu-PF [Mugabe's ruling party]." When 
the coalition changes, so does who is rich and who is poor. 
In addition to examining the significance of income inequality on affecting the ability of 
a national leader to retain his or her position, this thesis will also examine their 
simultaneous relationship. Leaders do seem to have an incentive to influence the 
economic system. Income inequality might be a part of that system, or it might even be 
directly influenced by the leader in power. 
Using a lagged income inequality variable might help remove the problem of endogeneity 
since political leaders cannot influence the income inequality of the years before they 
were in a position of power. However, using a lagged version of a very slow moving 
variable such as income inequality might not make much difference at all. Furthermore, 
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endogeneity may persist since it may be the entire political system (or other variables for 
that matter) due to which political survival and income inequality may be linked. 
Methods to address potential endogeneity with the full detail of the model will be 
presented in later sections. The next section, Section 2, will discuss the theory and 
existing evidence on income inequality and leadership change. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Income Inequality and short term political survival prospects 
There may be a number of reasons why greater income inequality may decrease the 
probability of political survival. First, greater income inequality may make the majority 
of the population, who are likely to be on the lower end of the income distribution graph, 
unhappy with the incumbent leaders. This unhappiness may decrease public ratings of the 
leaders, strengthen the opposition party, or even cause a revolution. 
Secondly, higher income inequality generates a highly skewed income distribution graph, 
with a small fraction of population at the top income earning tier, while leaving a large 
number of population at the bottom. In a true democracy, this majority of the population 
are likely to blame the incumbent leaders for this great divide, instead of capitalism itself. 
Naturally, the incumbent leaders may be excommunicated, or to be less dramatic, voted 
out of office. Olson ( 1963) and Huntington ( 1968, 1991) have argued that income 
inequality, caused by rapid economic growth, could strain the social fabric, potentially 
leading to political instability. 
However, we should refrain from wishful thinking. It might not be so easy to remove a 
political leader. Mere unhappiness might not be enough. Greater income inequality is 
often a symptom of corruption. If everyone in the political sphere is corrupt, leading to or 
benefitting from large income inequality, the incumbent leaders' political survival may 
not be influenced by the public. Further, a communist country (or even a socialist one) 
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may not be entirely democratic. A country like North Korea, would have no facility to 
change their political leaders. 
Or perhaps, there is no systematic relationship between income inequality and leadership 
change. If members of the electorate believe that national leaders have little impact on the 
income inequality, or if they are able to directly judge the leader's performance, their 
support for the leader may be unrelated to the income inequality. 
However, there are more complications in formulating a model that could provide an 
answer. There is evidence that political factors affect the economy, (since leadership does 
matter) meaning that the direction of causality is unlikely to be one-way. Barro (1991), 
Alesina et al. ( 1996), Brunetti ( 1997), and Przeworski et al. (2000), find that political 
instability is harmful to the economy. Political instability may follow protests, 
uncertainty, and low investment, thus hurting the economic growth rate. This decrease in 
the economic growth rate might lower income inequality, thus potentially giving the 
illusion that lower income inequality leads to a decrease in the probability of political 
survival. 
Income inequality is also shown to be correlated with economic growth. Berg et al. 
(2018) show that lower net inequality is robustly correlated with faster and more durable 
growth, after controlling for the level of redistribution. They use two econometrics 
approach: first, the effect on medium term growth, and second, the duration of growth 
spells. For the former, they find higher inequality lowers growth, and that redistribution 
has a tiny and statistically insignificant effect. For the latter, they find higher inequality 
has a statistically significant relationship with the duration of growth spells. Furthermore, 
inequality has shown to intensify the financial cycle that leads to crisis risk (Rajan, 2010). 
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In an unequal society, through the influence of the rich, political and economic factors 
allow financial excess to increase out of control (Stiglitz, 2010). The crisis risk will 
eventually lead to economic shocks, and in an unequal society, there is less social 
consensus required to adjust in the face of these shocks (Easterly, 2007; Berg et al, 2012). 
Further still, there may be other variables that may affect both political survival and 
income inequality in the country. These variables could take the form of institutions, 
government policies, global events such as the end of the Cold War or the recession of 
2008, and expectations concerning political stability. Five centuries and a half earlier, 
Niccolo Machiavelli (1532) observed that an autocratic ruler lasts longer in office than a 
democratic ruler, and advised in his famous book, the Prince, that a ruler is better off 
feared than loved. Indeed, the regime type of a country may also be one of those variables 
in influencing political survival. 
In Machiavelli's view, whoever desires to establish a kingdom or principally where 
liberty and equality prevail, will equally fail, unless he withdraws from that general 
equality a number of the boldest and most ambitious spirits, and makes gentlemen of 
them, not merely in name but in fact, by giving them castles and possessions, as well as 
money and subjects; so that surrounded by these he may be able to retain his power. In 
this way, inequality may cause higher chances of political survival. 
Echoing Machiavelli, in "The Dictator's Handbook", Mesquita and Smith (2011) state 
five rules that leaders should use to stay in power: ( 1) The smaller the winning coalition, 
the fewer people to satisfy to remain in control. (2) Having a large nominal selectorate 
gives a pool of potential people to replace dissenters in coalition. (3) Maintain control of 
revenue flows to redistribute to your friends. (4) But only pay friends enough that they 
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will not consider overthrowing you and at the same time little enough so that they depend 
on you. (5) Don't take your friends' money and redistribute it to the masses. 
The fifth rule seems extremely pertinent to our research. Mesquita and Smith (2011) have 
argued that redistribution efforts by a leader might be their own undoing. Although they 
did not study income inequality, one can infer that high inequality might aid in political 
survival. In a podcast they did with EconTalk host Russ Roberts (2016), they present a 
fascinating yet depressing positive correlation between the reputation of an American 
president and the number of people dying in wars while that president is in office. They 
argue that the decision of how and when to go to war is made in self-interested ways 
rather than in consideration of what is best for the nation. In parallel ways, redistribution 
efforts to decrease inequality are also made in self-interested ways rather than the 
nation's best interest. 
Even in democracies, the notion that inequality should be at least partially self-correcting 
has not found empirical support. Meltzer and Richard ( 1981) present a model where 
increased inequality leads the median voter to demand more redistribution. Redistribution 
is limited, however, because higher rates of taxation reduce the labor supply. 
Furthermore, in any economy, unequal turnout or unequal political power can create a 
situation where the pivotal voter under majority rule may have greater income than the 
median. When a society has large numbers of relatively poor residents without voting 
rights, as arises with substantial immigration, redistribution will be limited even when all 
those enfranchised people participate fully (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 2006). 
The impact of the type of polity on inequality and political survival is clear, even though 
the direction of the effect is debated. Bonica et al. (2013) present possible reasons why 
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the US political system has during the last few decades failed to counterbalance rising 
inequality. One reason is that both Republican and Democratic parties have experienced 
an ideological shift towards acceptance of a form of a free market capitalism, which 
offers less support for government provision of redistribution. Another reason is that the 
rich have been able to use their resources to influence electoral, legislative, and 
regulatory process through campaign contributions, lobbying and revolving door 
employment of politicians and bureaucrats. This suggests a simultaneous relation 
between political leaders, income inequality and the type of polity itself. 
Only a modicum of research has addressed the potential endogeneity of political survival. 
Burke (2012) used commodity prices, export partner growth, precipitation and rainfall as 
instruments to address the possibility of two way causation between political survival and 
economic growth. As we would expect, precipitation and rainfall were shown to be weak 
instruments. The selectorate theory discussed below also outlines the endogeneity 
problem caused by simultaneity. 
2.2 The Selectorate Theory 
Mesquita et al. (2003) present the selectorate theory in order to analyze political survival, 
and one can see from their argument how income inequality and political survival are 
endogenous. The selectorate theory is founded upon two main terms: the selectorate and 
the winning coalition. The selectorate is defined as the set of people whose endowments 
include the qualities or characteristics institutionally required to choose the government's 
leadership and necessary for gaining access to private benefits given out by the 
government's leadership. In general, the selectorate is the set of people who can 'select' 
their leader. 
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The winning coalition is defined as a subset of the selectorate of sufficient size such that 
the subset's support endows the leadership with political power over the remainder of the 
selectorate as well as over the disenfranchise members of the society. In exchange for 
their support, members of the winning coalition receive a share of whatever private 
benefits the incumbent leader give out to her supporters. 
Figure 1: Diagram illustrating the relationship between Winning Coalition and the 
Selectorate 
In a hereditary monarchy, the lineage required for selectorate membership occurs among 
a definite subset of the population: the aristocracy or nobility. Anyone in that subset, by 
definition, is adequately endowed with the quality of lineage. The winning coalition must 
include approximately a simple majority of those with the necessary lineage. Therefore, 
in a strictly hereditary system, a majority of the relevant aristocracy's support is sufficient 
to ensure that an individual becomes or remains a monarch. Here, both the selectorate and 
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the winning coalition are small, with the ratio of the winning coalition to the selectorate 
being approximately one-half. 
In a true democracy, the selectorate is the entire population of citizens who have the right 
to vote, while the winning coalition is that majority subset of the selectorate whose votes 
enable the leader to be elected. Here, both the selectorate and the winning coalition are 
large, with the ratio of the winning coalition to the selectorate also being approximately 
one-half. 
However, a winning coalition can be considerably less than half of the selectorate in a 
rigged electoral system, like the systems that have operated in Iraq, Kenya, and many 
other places, including the Soviet Union. In the Soviet Union for instance, the selectorate 
consisted of as many as all adult citizens, while the winning coalition consisted of the 
subset of the selectorate and in addition, who possessed a defined special proficiency, 
including a membership in the Communist Party. 
The fundamental premise in selectorate theory is that the primary goal of a leader is to 
remain in power. To remain in power, leaders must maintain their winning coalition. 
When the winning coalition is small, as in autocracies, the leader will tend to use private 
goods to satisfy the coalition. When the winning coalition is large, as in democracies, the 
leader will tend to use public goods to satisfy the coalition. 
In the Soviet Union, the small winning coalition was given access to special privileges 
not granted to the rest of the selectorate. George Arbatov (1993) observed: 
"The number of people who received various perks grew constantly under Khruschchev 
and Brezhnev, keeping up with the growth in sheer numbers of the party's administrative 
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system. People abused these privileges shamelessly, even flaunted them. They lived with 
an incredible extravagance and a luxury that bordered on the absurd." 
Mesquita et al. (2003) have argued that leaders survive longest when they depend on a 
small coalition and a large selectorate, because it is easier to satisfy a small coalition. 
They also do least under these conditions to promote the well-being of most people living 
under their control. It follows from these private benefits doled out to the winning 
coalition that inequality is an obvious byproduct. Those people in the winning coalition 
who are given private benefits are a lot more well off than those not in the winning 
coalition. Hence, there is a simultaneous relationship between the inequality, political 
survival and the type of polity. 
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3.1 The Model 
CHAPTER THREE 
METHODOLOGY 
Based on literature and real world events, our empirical model can be set up as follows: 
(1) 
where the dependent variable De,t is equal to 1 if there is an exit of the effective primary 
national leader during year t (excluding exits due to natural death or deposition by 
another state), and 0 otherwise. This dependent variable covers exits of leaders brought 
about by election loss, resignation, loss of cabinet support, loss of the support of the 
legislature, sickness, coup, popular revolt, assassination, domestic armed rebellion, and 
other means. Ge, 1-1 is the Gini coefficient for income distribution in year t-1. We could 
use a longer lag of Gini since Gini coefficients do not show much variation in one year). 
X' e, t-j is a vector of time-varying control variables. le is a vector of country fixed effects, 
11 is a vector of year fixed effects, and Ee, 1 is an error term, with E(Ee, 1) = 0. 
The binary dependent variable in equation ( 1) will be estimated using Linear Probability 
Model (LPM). For this model, the relationship between dependent and independent 
variables is a particularly simple one, and allows the model to be fitted by simple linear 
regression. However, the estimated coefficients can imply probabilities outside the unit 
interval [O, 1] which is why we also estimate the above equation using a lo git model. A 
probit model, however might not be suited to a fixed effects treatment (Greene 2000). 
20 
The logit function or the log-odds is the logarithm of the odds pl( 1-p) where p is the 
probability that the leader will exit. This gives the odds ratio, which we later back-
transform the estimated regression coefficients off of the log scale so that we can 
interpret the conditional effects of each variable. 
Survival analysis is also a particularly suitable method for analysis, given that it is a 
collection of statistical procedures for data analysis for which the outcome variable of 
interest is time until an event occurs (Kleinbaum and Klein, 1996). This method is 
generally used in epidemiology and health related research, as outcome variable of 
interests are usually death, disease incidence, or some other individual experience. The 
event of interest in this thesis is the exit of the political leader, and the outcome variable 
of interest is time until the leader exits. 
Survival analysis is very well suited to handle the analytical problem of censored data. In 
essence, censoring occurs when we have some information about individual survival 
time, but we don't know the survival time exactly. A type of censored data is when a 
leader does not experience an exit before the end of the dataset, i.e. the year 2016. 
President Barack Obama' s incumbency is an example of censored data, since his exit 
from office was after 2016. Similar to the odds ratio given by the logit model, the cox 
proportional hazard model gives an estimate of the hazard rate. The hazard rate can be 
interpreted as the instantaneous potential per unit time for the event to occur, given that 
the individual has survived. It is calculated as: 
P(t :5 T < t +flt IT;::: t) 
h(t) = Iim--------
Llt->o flt 
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In mathematical terms, the 'given' part of the formula for the hazard function is found in 
the probability statement in the numerator to the right of the limit sign. This statement is 
a conditional probability because it is of the form, "P of A, given B," where the P denotes 
probability and where the long vertical line separating A from B denotes "given." In the 
hazard formula, the conditional probability gives the probability that a person's survival 
time, T, will lie in the time interval between t and t + i1t, given that the survival time is 
greater than or equal to t. Because of the given sign here, the hazard function is 
sometimes called a conditional failure rate. 
In Kleinbaum's (1996) own words, "To get an idea of what we mean by instantaneous 
potential, consider the concept of velocity. If, for example, you are driving in your car 
and you see that your speedometer is registering 60 mph, what does this reading mean? It 
means that if in the next hour, you continue to drive this way, with the speedometer 
exactly on 60, you would cover 60 miles. This reading gives the potential, at the moment 
you have looked at your speedometer, for how many miles you will travel in the next 
hour. However, because you may slow down or speed up or even stop during the next 
hour, the 60-mph speedometer reading does not tell you the number of miles you really 
will cover in the next hour. The speedometer tells you only how fast you are going at a 
given moment; that is, the instrument gives your instantaneous potential or velocity." 
Given the i1t in the denominator, the hazard is a rate rather than a probability. Similar to 
the idea of velocity, a hazard function h(t) gives the instantaneous potential at time t for 
getting an event, in this case, exit from office, given survival up to time t. This will 
hopefully be elucidated after we interpret results from the Cox model in the following 
chapter. 
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We control for time-varying factors such as the growth rate per capita, as measured by 
the GDP growth per capita (Burke, 2012). We lag the growth per capita by one year in 
hopes of circumventing the endogeneity problem here. By lagging it by one year, we are 
assuming that the political leader in power does not influence the GDP growth rate of a 
year ago. The log of GDP per capita is also used to control for the level of development 
attained by the country. This is not considered endogenous since GDP moves relatively 
slowly and by the time the leaders come in power, relatively equivalent level of 
development would already have been achieved. Secondary school enrollment is also 
included as a control variable since it could be a latent but important variable determining 
political survival. Many autocratic regimes, including the Rana regime of Nepal (1846 to 
1951 AD), had it in their interest to suppress education in hopes that the public might not 
awaken to their tyranny. Highly educated people are a potential threat to autocrats, and so 
autocrats make sure to limit educational opportunity. They want workers to have basic 
labor skills like literacy, but they want their own children to be well educated, and so 
send them off to schools in places like Switzerland, the United States and the United 
Kingdom. In fact, one might say that Oxford University is a breeding ground for 
authoritarians. It is the alma mater of many, including Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe, the 
Bhutto family of Pakistan, kings of Jordan, Bhutan, Malaysia, and even little Tonga. 
It is important to include urban concentration as a control variable. In "Cities and 
Stability", Jeremy L. Wallace (2014) provides an in-depth analysis of how cities function 
and how they provide a strong base for revolutions to ignite and overthrow the current 
regime. Historically speaking, most downfall of dictators, autocrats, and monarchs has 
been the effect of uprisings and revolutions in cities. 
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We follow Burke (2012) and we add leader specific control variables such as tenure, age 
and sex. Tenure is included to see how the probability of exit in the following year 
changes given that a leader has survived up to the current year. Burke (2012) showed that 
a strong ageing effect exists in that old leaders are generally voted out of office than 
young ones. A dummy variable for female is included to see whether male leaders or 
female leaders have higher probabilities for survival. 
A few other dummy variables are included to control for other exogenous factors. A 
dummy equal to 1 for the years 1989 - 1992 (or another time period) for countries 
classified as transition economies by the Development Research Institute (DRI 2009) and 
0 otherwise is included as a control variable since there are quicker exits during 
transitions (Burke, 2012). Dummies for elections that affect the effective primary 
national leader, a dummy for exit due to sickness, a dummy for exit due to death, and a 
dummy for the year of a legal term limit are also included to control for exits other than a 
regular exit. 
3.2 Simultaneous Equations Modelling 
The selectorate theory illustrates the problem of simultaneity bias. Inequality and political 
survival are simultaneously determined from the size of the winning coalition. The size of 
the winning coalition affects both inequality and the survival of political leaders. The 
figure below shows the relationship between the size of the winning coalition, income 
inequality and political survival. 
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Figure 2: Theoretical framework derived.from the selectorate theory 
I 
Inequality Political Survival 
Mesquita et al. use an extremely crude method of estimating the size of the winning 
coalition and the selectorate. In their own words, "Their objective is to evaluate the 
general tendency for the predictions of the selectorate model to be a significant 
component of broad array of phenomena, and not to maximize the variance explained for 
any dependent variable." The way they estimate the sizes of the winning coalition and the 
selectorate is through a combination of institutional variables collected from POLITY IV 
and Arthur Banks' cross-national time-series data. An institutional variable called 
Legislative Selection (LEGSELEC) is used as an indicator of the size of the selectorate. 
This is a categorical variable that takes a value of 0 if there is no legislature, 1 if the 
legislature is chosen by heredity, and 2 if the members of the legislature are directly or 
indirectly selected by popular election. Similarly, the authors estimate the size of the 
winning coalition by using a composite of variables from the POLITY database. 
We do not use the method used by Mesquita et al. for two main reasons. First, the authors 
have treated the coding convention (0, 1, or 2) as if it were a scale. They seem to have 
arbitrarily constrained the coefficient of the size of the selectorate, such that one value 
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would be twice the value of another. In other words, a LEGSELEC value of 2 would have 
double the selectorate size than a LEGSELEC value of 1. Secondly, the size of the 
winning coalition is almost perfectly correlated with the Polity variable, which measures 
the degree of democracy. Including the size of the winning coalition and the Polity 
variable will lead to a multicollinearity problem. 
The Polity variable itself is therefore, used in place of the size of the winning coalition. 
There are three reasons why using the polity variable instead of the size of the winning 
Figure 3: Theoretical framework for the Structural Equations Model 
Inequality Political Survival 
coalition is justified. First, the use of polity variable, which could be thought of as the 
degree of democracy, is much more intuitive and simpler than winning coalition size. 
Second, it is readily available from the POLITY IV database, and does not require 
arbitrarily selecting institutional variables as done by Mesquita et al. Finally, the highly 
significant correlation coefficient of 0.89 between the size of the winning coalition and 
the polity variable suggesting that autocracies usually have small winning coalitions, 
while democracies have a large winning coalition, ensures that we are basically 
measuring the same thing. 
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In order to separate the effects of income inequality on political survival, we construct a 
Structural Equations Model (SEM) with two separate equations. The structural equation 
is given as: 
Where, 
G = Gini Coefficient 
Polity= Type of polity, tends to 1 if country is democratic and tends to 0 if autocratic 
D =Dummy variable, =1 if there was exit of one or more leaders 
X' = Vector of time-varying control variables 
E = Error term 
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(2) 
(3) 
CHAPTER FOUR 
DATA 
Data was collected from a variety of sources and includes 152 countries for the period 
1962 - 2015. The data for political leaders was collected from a dataset called Archigos, 
which detailed the entry date and exit date of politicians from the 1800s to 2015. 
Inequality data was collected from the World Inequality Database (WID) maintained by 
an international academic consortium. Data was filtered to produce consistent estimates 
of the Gini coefficient of inequality. The Gini index or the Gini coefficient is a statistical 
measure of distribution which was developed by the Italian statistician Corrado Gini in 
1912. After arranging all households from the poorest to the richest, a Lorenz curve can 
be drawn by plotting cumulative percentages of the households against the corresponding 
cumulative percentages of income they receive. Gini coefficient can then be calculated as 
a ratio of the area between the Lorenz curve and the line of perfect equality (the 45° line) 
to the entire area below the 45° line. Another way of thinking about the Gini coefficient 
is as a measure of deviation from perfect equality. The further a Lorenz curve deviates 
Figure 4: The Lorenz. 
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from the perfectly equal straight line (which represents a Gini coefficient of 0), the higher 
the Gini coefficient and the less equal the society. 
Another important database was the Polity IV data, which detailed the various aspects of 
democracy in a country. Other covariates like percentage of population with secondary 
education, GDP growth per capita, demographic data, and others were collected from the 
World Bank database, World Development Indicators. 
A quick glance at the data shows that there was a total of 1247 exits of leaders and out of 
that 809 were 'regular' exits (after discounting for leaders who left office due to death, 
sickness or by reaching the end of their term limit). Only 51 of these politicians were 
female, while the mean age of the politician at the time of their exit is 58 years. 229 
leaders were deposed in their first year in office, while only 69 leaders lasted more than 
10 years. The leader, Hassanal Bolkiah from Brunei has the longest tenure of 52 years, 
while also being the incumbent today. 
The data also shows that autocrats seem to survive longer than their democratic 
counterparts, as the farmer's average tenure in is 8.7 years, while the latter enjoys an 
average of 3.6 years in office. Income inequality, however, is only slightly higher in 
autocracies, with a mean Gini coefficient of 0.42 than in democracies, with a mean score 
of 0.38. This inequality variable is almost bimodal, as the Gini score ranging between 
0.25 to 0.27 and between 0.46 to 0.5 have the highest frequencies. 
The summary statistics are given in the table below. 
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Ta hie I: S11111111c1r\· Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Min Max 
Dummy 7839 0.159332 0.366357 0 1 
Gini Coefficient 2969 38.81891 11.44815 15.55 78.6 
Growth Per Capita (Lagged) 8209 0.043724 0.149365 -3.12912 0.799368 
Log of GDP per capita 8592 22.82338 2.550038 15.99304 30.5555 
Urban Concentration 8284 33.66557 17.15468 2.867021 100 
Secondary Enrollment 7360 61.55373 34.68608 0 166.154 
Tenure 7672 5.749739 7.129686 0 48 
Age 7672 56.29262 11.09032 17 99 
Transition Period 10716 0.011385 0.106096 0 1 
Polity 8036 0.548637 0.370435 0 1 
Female 7672 0.035454 0.184935 0 1 
Term Limit 7120 0.036236 0.18689 0 1 
Sick dummy 7839 0.002551 0.05045 0 1 
Death dummy 7839 0.007909 0.088587 0 1 
Elections 8364 0.18221 0.38604 0 1 
A list of countries and their Gini coefficients for the year 2015 are given in Table 2. 
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Tah/e 2: Countries und their Ginis os 0(2015 
Gini::;35 35<Gini::;45 Gini>45 
Canada 31.6 United States 44.685 Honduras 49.59 
United Kingdom 34.2 Dominican Republic 44.695 Costa Rica 48.34 
Ireland 29.8 El Salvador 40.575 Ecuador 45.925 
Netherlands 28.5 Argentina 40.5 Brazil 51.315 
Belgium 26.5 Uruguay 40.18 Bolivia 46.715 
Luxembourg 28.5 Lithuania 37.55 Paraguay 51.10833 
France 29.35 Israel 36 Chile 48.5 
Switzerland 29.6 Malaysia 41.14333 South Africa 65.5 
Spain 34.55 China 46.2 
Portugal 33.8 Sri Lanka 46 
Germany 29.85 
Poland 32.6 
Austria 27.4 
Hungary 27.5 
Slovak Republic 24.4 
Italy 32.4 
Malta 28.1 
Croatia 30.755 
Slovenia 24.75 
Greece 34.1 
Cyprus 33.6 
Estonia 33.9 
Latvia 35 
Finland 25.6 
Sweden 27.25 
Norway 25.55 
Denmark 27.4 
Iceland 24.7 
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The bimodal nature of income inequality is shown in figure 1. 
Figure 5: Histogram for Gini Coeffi cient 
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Given this bimodal nature, we can divide all observations into two major groups: one 
with low inequality and one with high inequality. The low inequality group include those 
observations that have a Gini coefficient less than the mean of 38.82, while the high 
inequality group includes observations whose Gini coefficient is higher than the mean. 
Figure 6: Survival curves f or countries with high inequality and low inequality 
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A preliminary survival function graph shows that leaders tend to survive a lot more in 
highly unequal societies after they stay in office for a couple years. In both groups, 
around 80% of leaders survive their first year in office. Both groups have a similar 
survival rate up until around the 5 year mark, after which the difference is drastic. By 
simply eyeballing the graph, it can be seen that 37% of the leaders in the group with high 
income inequality survive IO years in office, while only around 20% of the leaders in the 
group with low income inequality survive the same number of years. The survival 
function graph also illustrates that no leaders in the group with low income inequality 
survive more than 18 years while there are still 25% of the leaders in the unequal 
societies surviving more than the same number of years. 
Table 3: Log rank testfor equalitr (~(sunfra!fimctions 
Events Events 
Gini_dummy observed expected 
0 215 156.16 
1 593 651.84 
Total 808 808 
chi2(1) 31.82 
Pr>chi2 0.000 
A log-rank test that tests for the null hypothesis of equal survival functions is rejected at 
the 1 % significance level and thus shows that the two survival curves are statistically 
different from one another. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RESULTS 
5.1 Preliminary Results 
We use three models to estimate the effects of income inequality on political survival. 
The results from a linear probability model, a logit model and a cox proportional hazard 
model is given below. 
Tahle 4: Regression Results 
LPM Lo git Cox Proportional 
Gini -0.00391 *** -0.0406*** -0.0235*** 
(0.00105) (0.0101) (0.00633) 
Growth per capita (lagged) -0.0441 -1.199* -0.229 
(0.0711) (0.621) (0.322) 
Urban concentration -0.000234 -0.00143 -0.00192 
(0.000892) (0.00579) (0.00388) 
Secondary Enrollment -0.00103** -0.00876** -0.00597** 
(0.000404) (0.00425) (0.00264) 
Tenure 0.000807 0.0104 0.061 
(0.0025) (0.0200) 0 
Age 0.00212** 0.0190** 0.0147*** 
(0.000975) (0.00799) (0.00552) 
Transition period 0.301 ** 1.934*** 1.236*** 
(0.126) (0.595) (0.417) 
Polity 0.104** 1.244*** 0.827** 
(0.043) (0.396) (0.326) 
Female -0.0641 *** -0.760** -0.410* 
(0.0193) (0.359) (0.215) 
Term limit 0.782*** 7.070*** 1.756*** 
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(0.0277) (1.019) (0.129) 
Sick Dummy 0.795*** 1.635*** 
(0.065) (0.466) 
Death Dummy 0.705*** 1.399*** 
(0.05) (0.376) 
Election (constructed) 0.233*** 1.855*** 1.028*** 
(0.0295) (0.153) (0.107) 
Constant 0.126* -1.516 
(0.0688) (1.512) 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Observations 2,019 2,005 2,019 
Number of countries 93 93 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
All three models show a negative relationship between income inequality and the 
probability of exit. These results are consistent with the Kaplan-Meier survival graph 
which showed that leaders tend to survive more in highly unequal societies. The LPM 
model shows that a one-point increase in the Gini coefficient decreases the probability of 
the incumbent leader exiting office the following year by 0.03%, ceteris paribus. 
Similarly, the logit model shows a 4% decrease in the odds of exiting office holding all 
other factors constant, since e-0 ·0415 = 0.96. The marginal effects that show the change in 
probability when the independent variables increase by one unit, are shown in Table 5 
below. 
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Tahle 5: Marginlll E.ffects 
VARIABLES 
Gini 
Growth per capita (lagged) 
Urban concentration 
Secondary Enrollment 
Tenure 
Age 
Transition period 
Polity 
Female 
Term limit 
Sick Dummy (omitted) 
Death Dummy (omitted) 
Election (constructed) 
Observations 
(1) 
Dummy 
-0.00499*** 
(0.00123) 
-0.148* 
(0.0766) 
-0.000176 
(0.000712) 
-0.00108** 
(0.000522) 
0.00127 
(0.00246) 
0.00234** 
(0.000980) 
0.238*** 
(0.0739) 
0.153*** 
(0.0488) 
-0.0936** 
(0.0442) 
0.870*** 
(0.162) 
0.228*** 
(0.0207) 
2,005 
Table 5 above shows that at the mean values, the change in probability of leader exit 
given a one unit change in the Gini Coefficient is a decrease by 0.499 percentage points. 
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The leader specific control variables sick dummy and death dummy are omitted because 
they predict exit perfectly. The classification statistics for this logistic regression is given 
in Table 6. 
Tahle 6: Clos.\{(irntion Stotistics 
Classified 
+ 
Total 
Classified+ if predicted Pr(D) 
TRUED defined as Dummy 
Sensitivity 
Specificity 
Positive predicted value 
Negative predicted value 
FALSE+ for true -D 
FALSE - for true D 
FALSE + rate for classified + 
FALSE - rate for classified -
Correctly classified 
D 
181 
215 
396 
>= 
<> 
-D Total 
28 209 
1581 1796 
1609 2005 
0.5 
0 
Pr(+j D) 45.71% 
Pr(-!- D) 98.26% 
Pr(D I+) 86.60% 
Pr(-D j -) 88.03% 
Pr(+i-D) 1.74% 
Pr(-! D) 54.29% 
Pr(-D I+) 13.40% 
Pr(D 1-) 11.97% 
87.88% 
The overall rate of correct classification is estimated to be 87.88, with 98.26% of the 
leaders remaining in power correctly classified (specificity), and 45.71 % of the leader 
exits correctly classified (sensitivity). 
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In the Cox Model, the negative coefficient of 0.0235 translates to a decreased risk of 
exiting office of 2.32% (calculated as 1 - e-0·0235 ) when the Gini coefficient increases by 1 
point, controlling for all other covariates. In other words, a unit increase in the Gini 
coefficient increases the hazard rate, or the instantaneous potential for exiting office by 
2.32%. 
Results on the control variables indicate that a strong ageing effect exists: older leaders 
are statistically more likely to lose their jobs, even after controlling for tenure. All else 
equal, higher secondary enrollment is associated with lower probability of exit. This 
could be because the public might assign this improvement in their country to their 
respective leaders and believe that the leader helped achieve this improvement. Leaders 
of transition economies were more likely to lose office. Unsurprisingly, leaders are more 
likely to lose office subsequent to elections, upon reaching their term limit, and upon 
leaving due to sickness and death. Female leaders tend to last more in office than their 
male counterparts, and autocratic leaders tend to last more in office given the positive 
coefficient on the polity variable. 
5.2 Robustness Check 
Given the bimodal nature of the Gini Coefficient, a robustness analysis is conducted to 
see whether the results change when the assumptions change. There may be uncertainty 
regarding the model specification but a robustness test can improve the validity of 
inferences (Plumper and Neumayer, 2017). 
An additional dummy variable is created, which takes a value of 1 if the Gini Coefficient 
is greater than 40, and 0 if otherwise. The number 40 is selected since it separates 
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observations into roughly two normal distributions with separates modes as shown in 
Figure 1. Another form of robustness check is conducted by excluding all observations 
between 36 and 39, and redoing the estimation. 
The regression results in table 4 show that the dummy variable for high Gini Coefficients 
are statistically significant at the 5% significance level. Column 1 is a re-estimation of the 
first column from Table 3 with the additional dummy variable for high Gini coefficients. 
Column 2 is also the same as Column 1 with only one difference: the estimation in the 
second column excludes all observations with Gini Coefficients between 36 and 39. 
Similarly, columns 3 and 4 is a re-estimation of the Lo git model from table 3, and column 
5 and 6 is a re-estimation of the Cox Proportional model. 
In all six models, highly unequal societies have a significantly lower probability of leader 
exit than societies with low Gini Coefficients. The LPM estimate for the Gini dummy in 
column 1, for instance, is -0.0936 which means that highly unequal countries have a 
lower probability of leader exit than that in countries with low inequality by 0.0936. The 
results hold for all six models. 
Tahle 7: Ro/Justness Check 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
VARIABLES LPM LPM2 Lo git Logit2 Stcox Stcox2 
Gini -0.0005 -0.00053 -0.00194 -0.00642 -0.00322 -0.00388 
(0.00162) (0.0017) (0.017) (0.0185) (0.0102) (0.0108) 
High Gini dummy -0.0936** -0.0847** -1.195*** -1.024** -0.552** -0.495** 
(0.0384) (0.0383) (0.38) (0.43) (0.223) (0.245) 
Growth PC -0.0474 -0.0808 -0.603 -0.915 -0.265 -0.365 
(0.0708) (0.0581) (0.553) (0.6) (0.325) (0.327) 
39 
Urban -0.00013 2.72E-05 -0.00167 0.000977 -0.00144 -0.00094 
(0.00088) (0.00085) (0.00897) (0.00951) (0.00386) (0.00404) 
Secondary Enroll -0.00113*** -0.000985** -0.0118*** -0.0119** -0.00663** -0.00685** 
(0.00041) (0.00041) (0.00434) (0.00482) (0.00263) (0.00291) 
Tenure 0.000954 0.00540** 0.0529** 0.0653*** 0.137 0.448 
(0.00243) (0.00247) (0.023) (0.0245) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age 0.00217** 0.00218** 0.0221 ** 0.0215** 0.0144*** 0.0155*** 
(0.00097) (0.00086) (0.00935) (0.00985) (0.00551) (0.00574) 
Transition Period 0.304** 0.319** 1.969*** 2.277*** 1.253*** 1.369*** 
(0.13) (0.127) (0.607) (0.641) (0.417) (0.425) 
Polity 0.104** 0.136*** 1.206*** 1.679*** 0.823** 1.147*** 
(0.0409) (0.0443) (0.465) (0.542) (0.324) (0.374) 
Female -0.0587*** -0.0648*** -0.830** -0.885** -0.373* -0.394* 
(0.0192) (0.0184) (0.384) (0.404) (0.215) (0.221) 
Term Limit 0.787*** 0.798*** 6.967*** 6.996*** 1.789*** 1.775*** 
(0.0275) (0.0313) (0.779) (0.792) (0.13) (0.134) 
Sick dummy 0.781 *** 0.777*** 20.15 21.51 1.563*** 1.747*** 
(0.065) (0.0747) (3,909) (7,916) (0.468) (0.512) 
Death dummy 0.705*** 0.692*** 19.23 20.29 1.367*** 1.318*** 
(0.0498) (0.0473) (2,683) (4,318) (0.376) (0.381) 
Election 0.232*** 0.230*** 1.836*** 1.902*** 1.021 *** 1.050*** 
(0.0296) (0.0296) (0.156) (0.164) (0.107) (0.111) 
Constant 0.0368 -0.0274 -3.554*** -3.990*** 
(0.000) (0.0842) (0.905) (0.99) 
Observations 2,019 1,897 2,019 1,897 2,019 1,897 
Number of c_id 93 92 93 92 
The results of all models as well as the Kaplan Meier survival graph support the 
hypothesis that high inequality is associated with longer political survival. Income 
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inequality and political survival could very well be endogenous, as suggested by the 
selectorate theory. Using lagged income inequality gives out similar results to that of 
table 3. It could very well be that highly unequal societies are the by-product of a 
political system where the exit of a leader is unlikely. This possibly explains the 
significant negative sign on the Gini Coefficient in the three regression models. 
Table R: A correlation matrix shm\'s that as polities 11101·e tmrnrds democracies, 
i11eq11a Ii t_\· f(1 I ls 
Gini Polity 
Gini 1 
Polity -0.2129 1 
We move ahead with the simultaneous equations model. The log of GDP is also used as 
an independent variable to satisfy the order condition for parameter identification. 
We then construct another Kaplan Meier survival function based on Polity_dummy. This 
polity dummy takes the value of 1 if the country is relatively democratic, i.e., its polity 
score is greater than 0.5, and 0 if otherwise. 
The survival graphs show what was predicted from the selectorate theory. Autocrats tend 
to survive a lot more in office than do democrats. Even more interestingly, it is very 
difficult for autocrats to survive their early years in office, even harder than for democrats 
if we look at just the first year. For autocrats, it is hard to find sources of revenues to 
satisfy their winning coalition in their first year. It comes of no surprise that we often see 
looting, confiscations, and extractions during political transitions. 
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Figure 7: Surl'ival curve for leaders in autocracies and democracies 
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5.3 Simultaneous Equations Model Results 
The regression results from the SEM model is shown below. 
Table 9: Simultaneous Equations Model Results 
VARIABLES Gini Coefficient dummy 
Gini coefficient -0.00391 *** 
(0.00079) 
Transition Period 0.301 *** 
(0.107) 
Growth per capita (lagged) -0.0441 
(0.0607) 
Secondary Enrollment -0.00103*** 
(0.00033) 
Tenure 0.000807 
(0.00216) 
Age 0.00212*** 
(0.00074) 
Female -0.0641 *** 
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(0.0213) 
Urban Concentration 0.108*** -0.00023 
(0.0176) (0.00049) 
Polity -5.769*** 0.104*** 
(0.849) (0.0326) 
Term Limit 0.782*** 
(0.0186) 
Election 0.233*** 
(0.0214) 
Sick dummy 0.795*** 
(0.0595) 
Death dummy 0.705*** 
(0.0402) 
GDP per capita (Logged) -1.781 *** 
(0.143) 
Constant 85.70*** 0.126* 
(3.628) (0.066) 
Observations 2,019 2,019 
The results shown above in table 4 provide estimates of how the type of polity 
simultaneously influence income inequality as well as the survival of leaders. Looking at 
the first column in table 4, the type of polity negatively affects income inequality. 
Autocratic countries are associated with higher income inequality, while democratic 
countries have lower income inequality. Similarly, the log of GDP per capita is also seen 
to be negatively related with Gini coefficients. Rich countries and countries that have 
attained a certain level of development generally have lower Gini coefficients, and thus 
lower income inequality. Finally, the urban concentration variable has a positive 
coefficient which implies that countries with higher urban concentration generally have 
higher income inequality. This is consistent with prior literatures and intuitive thinking. 
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The results of the second equation are identical with results from the LPM, Logit and the 
Cox Proportional Hazard Model. Income inequality is still negatively correlated with the 
probability that a leader is going to exit office. A high level of inequality could be a sign 
that the winning coalition is deriving private benefits from the incumbent leader while 
citizens not in the winning coalition are not gaining or gaining very few benefits (mostly 
public) from the policies set by the incumbent leader. This could be one reason why 
higher inequality induces the winning coalition to keep the incumbent leader in power. 
The effect on other covariates have also not changed. Secondary enrollment are 
significant at the 1 % significance level, and are negatively associated with the probability 
that a leader exits office. The ageing effect still exists as old leaders have more of a 
tendency to exit out of office, even after we control for tenure. Females last longer in 
office than their male counterparts. However, this could be because out of our sample of 
1981 observation, there were only 61 female leaders. Finally, leaders have a higher 
probability of exit during periods of transition. Like before, it is not surprising that 
leaders tend to exit a lot more during elections, and at the end of their term limits. 
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CONCLUSION 
This paper explores whether a nation's level of income inequality affects the short-run 
political survival prospects of that nation's leader. The simultaneous equations model 
controls for the simultaneity bias between the size of the winning coalition, income 
inequality and probability of leader exit. The results provide evidence that higher income 
inequality increases the likelihood that national leaders will retain their position. 
There have been no studies that have typically examined the effect of income inequality 
on democratic election results. This paper provides causal evidence of a relationship 
between income inequality and political survival that extends beyond the ballot box. The 
magnitude of the estimated impact of income inequality on political survival is quite 
small. The SEM estimate in column 2 of Table 5 indicates that a one point increase in the 
Gini Coefficient reduces the probability of leader change by 0.4%. 
The results provide important lessons for the rich who want to stay rich, for autocrats, or 
even budding dictators. For the rich, it is easier to protect their fortunes simply by 
maintaining their political support to leaders in order to protect their wealth, or income. 
Autocrats and dictators can use these results as evidence to back up one of Mesquita and 
Smith's (2011) rules for successful dictatorship: Don't take your friends' money and 
redistribute it to the masses. 
The findings of this paper have important implications. We can understand why some 
believe that stable leadership is good for economic well-being. But autocrats do not grow 
more efficient at improving their society over time. The uncertainty provoked by 
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instability might be thought to scare investors, but those effects - if they exist at all - are 
offset by the advantages inherent in political competition. 
Policy changes need to address the political incentives for greedy, corrupt and rent-
seeking governance. The mechanism with which political leaders stay in power by 
appealing to the rich, or how the rich enable the political leaders they support to stay in 
power need to be addressed. The political transition from a society ruled by an exclusive 
group to one with a broad, inclusive coalition structure, i.e. a more democratic polity, 
appears to be fundamental for sustained improvement in the quality of life for the world's 
economically, socially, or politically oppressed people. 
Further research could be done to refine the effect of inequality on political survival. We 
could see if the results improve or worsen when we use wealth inequality, instead of 
using income inequality. Introducing taxation and/or spending on public goods might 
help shed some light on how attempts to reduce inequality (if they exist at all) may 
impact prospects of survival. 
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
Exit of leader in year: Binary variable= 1 if there are one or more exits of the effective 
primary national leader during the year for reasons other than natural death or foreign 
deposition; 0 otherwise. Goemans et al. (2009). 
Gini Coefficient: Measure of income inequality. Higher Gini coefficients indicate higher 
income inequality. World Inequality Database (2015) 
GDP per capita growth: Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based on 
constant local currency. World Bank (2015). 
Urban concentration: The share of the urban population in a country that lives in its 
largest city. Calculated by dividing population estimate for the largest city by the total 
urban population of the country. United Nation's Population Division's World 
Urbanization Prospects (2009). 
Secondary enrollment rate (% gross): Number of pupils enrolled in secondary education, 
regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population in the theoretical age group 
for secondary education. Data from the World Bank (2016b) and DRI (2009). Data are 
interpolated (linear). 
Tenure of leader in power at start of year (years): Sum of 31 Decembers that the leader 
has been in office during current tenure. Calculated for leader in office on 1 January 
using Goemans et al. (2009). 
Age of leader in power at start of year (years): Calendar year minus birth year of leader in 
office on 1 January, calculated using Goemans et al. (2009). 
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Transition dummy: Binary variable, = 1 for the years 1989-1992 for transition economies; 
0 otherwise. DRI (2009). 
POLITY2 (rescaled): Revised Combined Polity Score of the Polity IV Project. Marshall 
et al. (2010). Rescaled so it ranges from 0 (full autocracy) to 1 (full democracy). 
Female dummy: Binary variable, =1 if effective national leader is female; 0 otherwise. 
Goemans et al. (2009). 
Term limit dummy: Binary variable, = 1 if national leader left office due to legal 
requirement during year; 0 otherwise. Self-constructed. Does not include cases in which a 
national leader avoided a requirement to leave office. 
Sick dummy: Binary variable, = 1 if national leader left office due to sickness during year; 
0 otherwise. Self-construction. 
Death dummy: Binary variable, =1 if national leader died while in office; 0 otherwise. 
Self-construction. 
Election dummy: Binary variable, =1 if an election affecting the effective national leader 
occurred during the year; 0 otherwise. Constructed with election data from Goemans 
(2009) using the following operation on six binary variables: Presidential election 
(0,l)*Leader subject to presidential elections (0,1) +Parliamentary election (O,l)*Leader 
subject to parliamentary elections (0, 1) + Presidential or parliamentary election 
(O,l)*Assemblyelected president (0,1). Beck et al. (2001) and other sources used to 
allocate leaders to elections. 
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ANNEX 
Figure 9: Survival curve for leaders in high growth countries vs low growth countries 
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Figure JO: Survival curve for leaders in high GDP countries vs low GDP countries 
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Figure 11: Survival Curves for Low Urban Concentration countries vs High Urban 
Concentration countries 
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Figure 12: Survival curve for leaders in high secondary enrollment countries vs low 
secondary enrollment countries 
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Figure 13: Survival curve for young vs old leaders 
0 
~ 
lO 
f'-. 
c) 
0 
lO 
c) 
I 
lO 
N 
c) 
I 
I.., 
Kaplan-Meier survival estimates 
L,~ 
~L1 
-L'L._~ 
0 
0 
- --------
---------------------
c) 
0 10 20 30 40 50 
analysis time 
--- agedummy = O - Young leaders 
----- agedummy= 1 - Old leaders 
Figure 14: Survival curvesfor male leaders vs.female leaders 
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